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The Right Look: 
Conservative Politicians Look Better and Their Voters Reward It
* 
 
Previous research has established that good-looking political candidates win more votes. We 
extend this line of research by examining differences between parties on the left and on the 
right of the political spectrum. Our study combines data on personal votes in real elections 
with a web survey in which 2,513 non-Finnish respondents evaluated the facial appearance 
of 1,357 Finnish political candidates. We find that political candidates on the right are better 
looking in both municipal and parliamentary elections and that they have a larger beauty 
premium in municipal, but not in parliamentary, elections. As municipal candidates are 
relatively unknown, the beauty-premium gap indicates that voters – especially those to the 
right – use beauty as a cue for candidate ideology or quality in the municipal elections. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The  facial  appearance  of  political  candidates  and  their  electoral  success  are  related:  better-looking 
candidates win more votes (Todorov et al., 2005; Ballew and Todorov, 2007; Antonakis and Dalgas, 2009; 
Benjamin and Shapiro, 2009; Poutvaara et al., 2009; King and Leigh, 2009; Berggren et al., 2010; Rule at 
al., 2010; Lawson et al., 2010; Olivola and Todorov, 2010). While this has been established as a general 
relationship,  none  of  the  studies  look  at  differences  in  beauty  or  in  beauty  premia  between  political 
candidates from the left and from the right. A beauty gap between the main parties could give candidates 
from  one  side  an  edge  in  elections,  suggesting  a  possible  link  from  candidate  appearance  to  policy 
outcomes. A related question is whether voters on the left and on the right are equally sensitive to the 
looks of candidates. If not, the parties whose voters are more responsive to appearance might be expected 
to  select  and  attract  better-looking  candidates.  Since  voters  who  are  less  responsive  to  candidate 
appearance could be more responsive to policy, a vote maximizing party might be expected to gear its 
policy platform towards this group of voters, e.g., by targeted redistribution.
1  
We make use of a rich dataset of Finnish political candidates from different parties. The candidates 
were evaluated, through a web survey, by a large number of respondents from other countries on traits 
such as beauty and competence, and we relate those evaluations to the votes each candidate received in 
parliamentary and municipal elections. Given that Todorov et al. (2005), Ballew and Todorov (2007) and 
Antonakis and Dalgas (2009) have found that inferences of competence predict electoral success, we 
include photograph-based competence evaluations in our investigation, both separately and together with 
                                                    
1 On the importance of physical appearance for how people are perceived and treated outside of politics, see, e.g., Hamermesh and 
Biddle (1994), Langlois et al. (2000), Rule and Ambady (2008) and Todorov et al. (2011). On the evolutionary origins of an 
appreciation of beauty, see the original contribution by Darwin (1871) and recent evidence in Grammer et al. (2003). On the 
correlation between beauty and intelligence, see Kanazawa (2011). There are also some experimental studies that link facial 
appearance to participants’ own behavior and treatment of others: see Mulford et al. (1998), Solnick and Schweitzer (1999), 
Mobius and Rosenblat (2006), Wilson and Eckel (2006), and Andreoni and Petrie (2008).   3 
beauty.  
We focus our analysis on the National Coalition Party on the right and on the Social Democratic 
Party and the Left Alliance on the left. In Finland, as in most democracies, there is a clear left-right pattern 
in politics, with one or several parties on each side.
2 Finland’s proportional electoral system with personal 
votes enables us to estimate electoral beauty premia from within-party competition. This allows us to 
isolate the effect of beauty from other vote motives, like ideology, and to handle other empirical problems 
related to the selection and quality of candidates.  
In the 2003 Finnish National Election Study, most voters reported having been influenced by the 
political opinions and the party of the candidates when making their choice. But several other factors were 
also influential, including the experience, education, gender, fame and age of the candidates. Notably, 
more than one third of the voters were influenced by the presence and style of the candidates and more 
than one fifth by their election campaigns and advertisements. Table A.1 in the Appendix presents these 
numbers separately for right and left voters. For our purposes, it is eye-catching that voters who are 
politically to the right state that they were more influenced by education, presence and style, as well as by 
campaigns and advertisements, whereas voters to the left say that they were more influenced by the gender 
of the candidates. 
We establish two main results. First, we find that candidates on the right look better than candidates 
on the left. Second, we find a greater effect of good looks, in terms of more votes, for candidates on the 
right. The difference in appearance is found both in parliamentary and in municipal elections, whereas the 
difference in the electoral effects of appearance is only found in municipal elections.  Based on the fact 
that municipal candidates are relatively unknown, we discuss possible explanations for this pattern.  
                                                    
2 Budge and Robertson (1987: 394–395) differentiate between left and right in terms of “economic-policy conflicts – government 
regulation of the economy through direct controls or takeover … as opposed to free enterprise, individual freedom, incentives and 
economic orthodoxy.” On the usage and relevance of this terminology in modern politics, see Klingemann (1995), Bobbio (1996) 
and – for the Nordic countries – Grendstad (2003). Although politically relevant, left-right terminology involves simplification 
(Mair, 2007), and the exact meaning of the terms differ somewhat between political cultures (Zechmeister, 2006).   4 
 2.   Method 
 
2.1.   Survey and Data 
 
The  basis  for  this  study  is  a  web  survey  based  on  photographs  of  Finnish  political  candidates  with 
respondents from outside of Finland to ensure that the candidates were not recognized. Our data collection 
method comprised recruitment of students by colleagues at lectures at several universities as well as 
recruitment via newspaper and magazine articles and blogs. Each respondent was shown four photographs 
(two of each gender), one at a time, randomly chosen from the database of photographs, and was asked to 
evaluate each photograph, e.g., in terms of attractiveness and competence.
3 There was no time limit for 
looking at the photographs. To exemplify, one question was: 
What is your evaluation of the physical appearance or attractiveness of this person compared to 
the average among people living in your country of residence? 
Very unattractive (1) 
Below average (2) 
Average (3) 
Above average (4) 
Very handsome or beautiful (5) 
Cannot say/Prefer not to answer 
For our data analysis, the replies were coded from 1 to 5, as indicated above, but the numbers did 
not appear in the survey.
4 In this paper we study candidates from one party to the right, the National 
                                                    
3 Respondents could choose to evaluate further rounds of four photos and also, if so, choose to only look at photos of candidates 
of one particular gender. 
4 All of the results in the paper are qualitatively unaffected (but rescaled) if we use the share of respondents who replied that a 
political candidate was “Above average” or “Very handsome or beautiful” rather than relying on the 1–5 scale as our measure of 
beauty (and of competence).    5 




From a database containing 1,929 photographs of Finnish political candidates, we study photographs of 
candidates from the parties that can be classified to the political right or to the political left: the National 
Coalition Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Left Alliance. We only  include evaluations by 
respondents who evaluated at least four photographs, and only photographs with at least three evaluations. 
This  gives  us  1,357  photographs  in  total,  with  an  average  of  nine  respondents  per  photograph.  The 
photographs can be divided into 684 of women and 673 of men; 575 from the 2003 parliamentary election 
and 782 from the 2004 municipal elections; and 1,170 of non-incumbents and 187 of incumbents.
5 The 
photos  only  showed  the  faces  of  the  candidates.  No  information  was  given  about  any  candidate. 
Respondents were asked to report if they recognized any of the candidates. None of the respondents 
recognized a single candidate by name. 
The photographs used were displayed by the political parties on their campaign posters as well as in 
newspaper ads. Most voters can be expected to have seen most candidate photographs. There are two 
potential problems related to the use of candidate photographs. The first one is reverse causality – it could 
be that successful politicians have access to better photographers and stylists. The second one is omitted 
variables, if some politicians both dress in a certain way and do other unobserved things, like visit large 
numbers of voters, which help them getting elected. However, we expect both problems to be smaller 
when using official candidate photos. One problem we avoid is that more successful or better financed 
candidates hire better photographers. Likewise, a “bad hair day” would produce measurement error for a 
candidate if photos from the press were used, whereas with official candidate photos, one expects an 
                                                    
5 By incumbent is meant a political candidate who served in the office in question, or as members of the national or the European 
parliaments, at the time of the election.   6 
unflattering picture exposed in numerous posters to be detrimental for electoral success. In any case, 
Hamermesh  et  al.  (2002) find  that  clothes  and  makeup  only  affect  perceptions  of  a  person’s  beauty 
marginally. Finally, there are no indications that some parties spend more or less on having photographs 
taken of their candidates, or that the quality of the candidate photos differs between parties. 
 
2.3.   Respondents 
 
We had 2,513 respondents. This number greatly exceeds the number of respondents in comparable studies 
on the role of facial appearance in politics. In the pioneering study by Todorov et al. (2005), only 34 out of 
843  respondents  evaluated  beauty.  King  and  Leigh  (2009)  used  5  respondents.  The  majority  of  our 
respondents were from Sweden or the United States, but we also had significant participation from France, 
Germany and Denmark. As reported in Berggren  et al. (2010), we find that respondents in different 
Western  countries  make  similar  evaluations.  Lawson  et  al.  (2010)  generalize  this  finding  to  more 
dissimilar countries by demonstrating that evaluations by subjects living in the United States and India 
predict actual election outcomes in Mexico and Brazil quite accurately. Likewise, Rule et al. (2010) report 
that American and Japanese participants made similar inferences of traits from the faces of both U.S. and 
Japanese political candidates, and their evaluations predicted election outcomes between cultures.  
 
2.4.   Electoral System 
 
Finland has a proportional electoral system in both municipal and parliamentary elections. Each voter has 
to vote for one candidate on a party list. Unlike in some other countries, it is not possible to vote for a list 
without picking a candidate. The seats are allocated to different parties based on their vote shares, using 
the d’Hondt seat-allocation rule. Candidates from a given party are elected in the order of their personal 
votes in their district. Elections are held every four years. 
Each  municipality  forms  one  district  in  municipal  elections.  The  number  of  elected  municipal   7 
councilors depends on the population of the municipality, reaching a maximum of 85 in Helsinki. Each 
party is allowed to present one and a half as many candidates on its list as the number of seats in the 
municipal council.  
At the national level, Finland has a one-chamber legislature with 200 members. The country is 
divided into 14 electoral districts that elect 199 MPs and an autonomous region (Åland) electing one MP. 
We study the 14 mainland districts. The number of candidates that a party can present equals the number 
of representatives elected from the district, if this is 14 or more. In small districts with less than 14 seats, a 
party can present 14 candidates.  
In the 2003 parliamentary election, turnout was 70%. Female candidates received 43% of all votes 
and won 75 of the 200 seats in parliament (Nurmi and Nurmi, 2004).
6 In the 2004 municipal elections, 
turnout was 59%.  
 
2.5.   Voter Information about Municipal and Parliamentary Candidates 
 
Electoral competition works quite differently at the municipal and at the national level. To win a seat in 
parliament,  a  candidate  normally  has  to  first  win  a  seat  in  the  municipal  council.
7    Politics  is  more 
competitive at the national level. 
Municipal elections can be characterized as low-information elections – defined by Buckley et al. 
(2007, 176) as “elections which do not involve significant constitutional office and do not attract large 
scale  media  coverage”  –  as  only  a  few  candidates  (especially  among  non-incumbents)  are  “career 
politicians”  who  are  politicians  by  occupation  or  have  a  history  of  active  campaigning  and  public 
visibility.  Advertising  is  mainly  restricted  to  posters  and  newspaper  ads;  hardly  any  candidates  run 
individual campaigns in television or radio.  
                                                    
6 Raunio (2005) presents more facts about the Finnish political system.  
7 Likewise in the next stage, a candidate who wants to win a seat in the European Parliament normally has to win a seat in the 
national parliament first.   8 
In  contrast,  the  parliamentary  election  can  be  characterized  as  one  of  high  information.  Many 
parliamentary candidates have previously held seats at the municipal level and have a political history that 
voters are aware of. Candidates who spend large amounts of money on campaigning are mainly observed 
in the parliamentary election. Parliamentary candidates are a more select group that is, for several reasons, 
more visible to the public.  
Table A.2 in the Appendix lists the share of different occupations for the candidates in our sample, 
as reported on electoral lists, in the municipal and in the parliamentary elections. The striking difference 
between  the  elections  is  that  one  of  eight  parliamentary  candidates  but  only  one  of  42  municipal 
candidates was working as a “political leader”. In most cases this means serving as MP. At the municipal 
level, only 15% of the incumbents are working as “political leaders” (including as MPs). 
 
3. Beauty and Electoral Success in Low-Information Elections 
 
In this Section we compare evaluations of left and right municipal candidates and investigate how the 
evaluations are related to electoral success in municipal elections. As the total amount of easily available 
information about the candidates is much smaller in municipal than in parliamentary elections, the looks 
of  candidates  could  be  relatively  more  important  to  voters  in  the  former  elections.  We  present 
corresponding results for parliamentary candidates in Section 4.  
  
     9 
3.1.   Trait Evaluations 
 
We begin by reporting the average trait evaluations of the municipal candidates. Table 1 reveals that right 
candidates are seen as more good-looking than left candidates, and are to a lesser extent also seen as more 
competent.    Female  candidates  (both  right  and  left)  receive  higher  beauty  evaluations  than  male 
candidates,  whereas  competence  evaluations  are  more  equal  for  females  and  males.  Incumbents  are 
generally  evaluated  as  better  looking  and  more  competent  than  non-incumbents.
8  The  correlation 
coefficient between beauty and competence is 0.39.
9  
Before moving on to the electoral effects of good looks we have to address a potential problem 
relating to the validity of the trait evaluations. Since it is likely that right and left candidates chose to 
present  themselves  in  a  somewhat  different  fashion  (e.g.,  with  regard  to  haircut,  clothing,  glasses, 
jewelry),  there  is  a  risk  that  the  evaluations  reflect  the  political  orientation  of  the  respondents.  In 
particular, our use of foreign respondents could be problematic if, for instance, U.S. respondents are more 
conservative on average and therefore evaluate right political candidates as relatively better looking. We 
address this issue from three angles. First, we divide the respondents according to their view on taxes and 
redistribution to investigate if the evaluation differences are driven by the political orientation of the 
respondents. Second, we compare the evaluations of respondents from Sweden and respondents from the 
United States. Third, we test if political candidates who wear a tie (for men) or a blouse and/or a suit (for 
women) are given different evaluations than those who do not. 
   
   
                                                    
8 The trait differences in Table 1 cannot be explained by age differences between left and right candidates. The mean age of left 
and right candidates differ by less than one year. Male candidates are four years older than female candidates and incumbents are 
seven years older than non-incumbents, on average.  
9 The correlation coefficient is 0.40 among male and 0.42 among female candidates, and 0.38 among right and 0.37 among left 
candidates.    10
TABLE 1.   Average trait evaluations, municipal elections (standard deviations in parentheses). 
  Beauty  Competence  Number of candidates 
Right candidates  2.89 (0.71)  3.32 (0.41)  263 
p-value of difference  0.000  0.001   
Left candidates  2.59 (0.61)  3.20 (0.45)  518 
Right female candidates  3.08 (0.79)  3.34 (0.37)  140 
p-value of difference  0.000  0.000   
Left female candidates  2.63 (0.67)  3.17 (0.41)  240 
Right male candidates  2.68 (0.53)  3.30 (0.45)  123 
p-value of difference  0.045  0.247   
Left male candidates  2.56 (0.60)  3.24 (0.49)  278 
Right female incumbents  3.05 (0.76)  3.34 (0.34)  22 
p-value of difference  0.190  0.831   
Left female incumbents  2.78 (0.63)  3.36 (0.47)  26 
Right male incumbents  2.77 (0.51)  3.48 (0.28)  25 
p-value of difference  0.055  0.640   
Left male incumbents  2.50 (0.52)  3.43 (0.48)  24 
Right female non-incumbents  3.08 (0.80)  3.34 (0.38)  118 
p-value of difference  0.000  0.000   
Left female non-incumbents  2.61 (0.67)  3.14 (0.39)  214 
Right male non-incumbents  2.65 (0.54)  3.26 (0.47)  98 
p-value of difference  0.184  0.582   
Left male non-incumbents  2.56 (0.55)  3.23 (0.78)  254 
All municipal candidates  2.69 (0.66)  3.25 (0.44)  781 
   Notes: Right candidates belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the 
Left Alliance. An incumbent is a political candidate who served in the office in question, or as a member of the national or the 
European parliaments, at the time of the election. One observation is the average evaluation of one candidate. P-values from a 
t-test of equal means are reported between each pair of average evaluations of right and left candidates. 
   
As reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix, the beauty differences between right and left candidates 
remain both for right and for left respondents (as classified by whether they agree or disagree with the 
suggestion “to increase taxes on those with high incomes in your country, and distribute the money to 
those  with  low  incomes.”).  For  male  candidates  the  beauty  difference  is,  however,  not  statistically 
significant when evaluated by left respondents. The differences in competence also remain in Table A.3, 
but are smaller and in some cases statistically insignificant. Table A.4 in the Appendix reveals that right 
candidates are perceived as more beautiful and competent both by respondents from Sweden and from the 
United  Sates  (although  for  male  candidates  the  differences  are  not  statistically  significant  among 
respondents from Sweden). Table A.5 demonstrates that what candidates wear only seems to affect how 
competent they are perceived to be. For beauty the difference is statistically insignificant throughout the 
Table. We also note that it does not seem to be the case that respondents to the right react differently to   11
male candidates wearing a tie or female candidates wearing a blouse and/or a suit than respondents to the 
left do. We conclude that the higher beauty and competence evaluations of right candidates do not just 
reflect the political opinions of the respondents. While the competence evaluations are, to some extent, 
related to what the candidates wear, the relationship does not differ between respondents to the left and to 
the right. 
 
3.2.   Electoral Success 
 
We  now  turn  to  regression  analysis  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  the  trait  evaluations  and 
electoral  success.  We  focus  on  non-incumbent  candidates,  as  Berggren  et  al.  (2010)  showed  that 
appearance does not matter as much for incumbents.
10 Appearance and other pieces of information may be 
more important for less well-known candidates, and an incumbency dummy may not fully capture such 
differences.
11 We make use of list fixed effects in our regressions, to capture how beautiful and competent 
a candidate is perceived to be in relation to the other candidates on the same list. We compare the electoral 
success of candidates from the National Coalition Party on the right, and from the Social Democratic Party 
and the Left Alliance on the left.
12   
Our dependent variable, Relative success, is defined in the following way for candidate i on list j:  
 
Relative successi,j = (pi / vj) * 100                                                                                         (1) 
                                                    
10 We are able to study non-incumbents separately as Finland has a proportional electoral system with personal votes determining 
the order in which candidates are elected, resulting in within-party competition. A plurality-vote system, like that of the United 
States, typically features competition between an incumbent and a challenger from another party. 
11 Caughey and Sekhon (2010) demonstrate the difficulty of estimating the incumbency advantage.  
12 The pooling of candidates from the Social Democratic Party and the Left Alliance is supported by statistical tests; there is no 
specification in which we can reject (at the 5% significance level) that the beauty coefficients are equal for candidates from these 
two parties.   12
 
where pi is candidate i’s number of personal votes and vj is the number of all votes for candidates on list j 
divided by the number of candidates on list j. As explanatory variables, we use the two trait variables 
Beauty and Competence. The trait variables are standardized: each mean assessment is divided by the 
standard deviation of all the mean assessments of that trait so that the trait variables all have a standard 
deviation of one. The beauty and competence variables are interacted with a dummy variable for right 
candidates  (i.e.,  candidates  who  belong  to  the  National  Coalition  Party).  We  also  include  a  dummy 
variable for male candidates, both by itself and interacted with Right.
13 Table 2 contains the regression 
results that allow us to compare the beauty and competence coefficients of right and left candidates. Since 
our identification comes from the interaction of the two trait variables Beauty and Competence with the 
dummy variable Right, we include the interaction of all unreported dummy variables with Right in most 
specifications,  but  we  do not  report  estimates  for  the  full set  of interaction  terms  in  the  Table.  The 
unreported dummies are Young, which denotes an age under 30, and Old, which denotes an age over 60, 
together with dummies for education and occupation.  
 
   
                                                    
13 No definitive gender differences with regard to beauty premia could be established by Berggren et al. (2010); however, other 
studies indicate that gender sometimes does matter for reactions to beauty. For example, Dreber et al. (2010) find that male chess 
players choose significantly riskier strategies when playing against an attractive female opponent, although this does not improve 
their performance.   13
TABLE 2.   Relative success in the municipal elections, non-incumbents. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Beauty  15.40***  15.91***  14.95**        8.62**  8.32*  8.49 
  (4.33)  (4.62)  (5.15)        (3.49)  (3.62)  (5.27) 
Beauty×Right  15.59*  18.64**  15.24**        22.60**  27.86***  25.35*** 
  (7.94)  (5.67)  (6.20)        (7.67)  (4.85)  (6.34)) 
Competence        18.94***  18.77*** 16.70**  14.75**  15.28**  12.99* 
        (5.28)  (5.41)  (5.85)  (5.16)  (5.09)  (6.29) 
Competence×Right        -9.05  -8.56  -14.84  -18.87**  -20.18**  -24.36** 
        (9.17)  (9.38)  (8.06)  (8.04)  (8.32)  (8.12) 
Male dummy  -20.66  -33.84  -34.41*  -28.25*  -36.15*  -36.43**  -22.42  -35.85*  -36.09** 
  (16.32)  (19.31)  (15.51)  (14.87)  (18.27)  (14.69)  (16.01)  (18.56)  (14.93) 
Male dummy×Right  
 












Age dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Education and 
occupation dummies 
No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Unreported dummies    
interacted with Right 
No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
List fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of candidates   682  682  682  682  682  682  682  682  682 
R-squared  0.02  0.02  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.14 
   Notes: The dependent variable is Relative success. Right candidates belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates 
belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. The education dummies are Comprehensive school or less (at most 
10 years of schooling); Upper-secondary education (corresponds to 12 years of schooling); Vocational education (10–12 years of 
schooling);  and  University  education  (those  who  have  completed  their  education  and  obtained  degrees).  Upper-secondary 
education  usually  serves  as  preparation  for  university-level  education,  and  many  of  the  candidates  with  upper-secondary 
education listed as highest education have started, but not completed, university studies. Vocational education includes, e.g., basic 
nurses, nurses, commercial school graduates, clerks, and artisans. The occupational dummies are political leader, party worker, 
management,  researcher,  teacher,  upper  white  collar,  medical  doctor,  nurse,  lower  white  collar,  worker,  entrepreneur,  artist, 
student, and not employed. Robust standard errors clustered at the list level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 2 contains nine specifications that vary in three dimensions: whether we include Beauty 
and/or  Competence,  whether  we  control  for  education  and  occupation,  and  whether  we  interact  the 
variables with unreported coefficients (age, education and occupation) with Right. The Table shows that 
in the municipal elections, the beauty coefficient of right candidates is between two and four times as 
large as that of left candidates (the total beauty coefficient of right candidates is obtained by adding the 
coefficients for Beauty and Beauty×Right). The difference between the competence coefficients of right 
and left candidates is generally smaller, although perceived competence only seems to matter for left   14
candidates.  
Neither the beauty nor the competence coefficients are much affected by including dummies for 
education  and  occupation.  However,  both  the  beauty  and  the  competence  coefficients  are  somewhat 
sensitive  to  including  the  other  trait  in  the  regression.  When  we  include  beauty  and  competence 
simultaneously  in  columns  7–9,  the  beauty  coefficient  falls  for  left  and  rises  for  right  candidates 
(compared with columns 1–3). The competence coefficient is reduced (compared with columns 4–6), but 
only marginally so for left candidates. The competence coefficient of left and that of right candidates are 
however only statistically different from zero at the 10% significance level when including the education 
and occupation controls and interacting all variables with Right (in column 9).     
   Beauty and competence display different relationships with electoral success for right and left 
candidates. The large beauty  estimates  (primarily  for  right  candidates)  obtained  when  controlling  for 
competence, education and occupation, as well as a full set of interaction terms (column 9), suggest that 
beauty is related to electoral success by itself and not just as a sign of competence. The relationship 
between competence and electoral success is estimated with less precision and the negative coefficients 
for right candidates imply a weaker relationship over the full sample of left and right candidates. 
  The estimates also suggest that female left candidates do better than male left candidates. For right 
candidates there is, however, no visible gender difference. In accordance with McDermott (1997), our 
interpretation is that voters use gender as a cue in low-information elections. Since women are typically 
seen as kinder and more compassionate than men, they are stereotyped as caring more about social welfare 
issues, which could make them preferable to men on a left party list with relatively unknown candidates. 
Finally, Table A.6 in the Appendix reports results for specifications that include both incumbents 
and non-incumbents. We note that the incumbency coefficient generally exceeds that of beauty by an 
order of magnitude. The estimated coefficients suggest that there is a positive relationship between beauty 
and electoral success, but we cannot reject that the relationship is the same for right and left candidates. 
The competence coefficients are small and statistically insignificant, both for left and right candidates.   
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4. Beauty and Electoral Success in High-Information Elections 
 
In this Section, we turn to politics at the national level. Compared with municipal elections, voters have 
considerably more information about the candidates in parliamentary elections. 
 
4.1.   Trait Evaluations 
 
Table  3 shows  that  right  candidates  are  judged  to  be  better  looking  than  left  candidates  also  in  the 
parliamentary election. Right parliamentary candidates are also generally seen as more competent than left 
candidates.
14 The correlation coefficient between beauty and competence is 0.36.
15 Compared with the 
municipal candidates in Table 2, the parliamentary candidates look slightly better and more competent.  
 
   
                                                    
14 The trait differences in Table 3 cannot be explained by age differences between left and right candidates. As in Table 1, the 
mean age of left and right candidates differ by less than one year.  
15 The correlation coefficient is 0.33 among male and 0.45 among female candidates, and 0.28 among right and 0.37 among left 
candidates.    16
TABLE 3.   Average trait evaluations, parliamentary elections (standard deviations in parentheses). 
  Beauty  Competence  Number of candidates 
Right candidates  2.93 (0.62)  3.55 (0.45)  202 
p-value of difference  0.000  0.000   
Left candidates  2.70 (0.67)  3.31 (0.51)  373 
Right female candidates  3.06 (0.67)  3.52 (0.40)  108 
p-value of difference  0.000  0.000   
Left female candidates  2.82 (0.74)  3.29 (0.46)  195 
Right male candidates  2.78 (0.51)  3.58 (0.49)  94 
p-value of difference  0.002  0.000   
Left male candidates  2.56 (0.56)  3.34 (0.55)  178 
Right female incumbents  3.54 (0.52)  3.87 (0.36)  16 
p-value of difference  0.001  0.001   
Left female incumbents  2.93 (0.53)  3.45 (0.36)  25 
Right male incumbents  2.92 (0.57)  3.64 (0.44)  21 
p-value of difference  0.012  0.214   
Left male incumbents  2.52 (0.49)  3.45 (0.55)  28 
Right female non-incumbents  2.98 (0.66)  3.45 (0.38)  92 
p-value of difference  0.070  0.001   
Left female non-incumbents  2.81 (0.76)  3.27 (0.76)  170 
Right male non-incumbents  2.73 (0.49)  3.56 (0.50)  73 
p-value of difference  0.035  0.001   
Left male non-incumbents  2.57 (0.57)  3.31 (0.55)  150 
All parliamentary candidates  2.78 (0.66)  3.39 (0.50)  575 
   Notes: Right candidates belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the 
Left Alliance. An incumbent is a political candidate who served in the office in question, or as a member of the European 
parliament, at the time of the election. One observation is the average evaluation of one candidate. P-values from a t-test of equal 
means are reported between each pair of average evaluations of right and left candidates. 
 
4.2.   Electoral Success 
 
As shown in Table 4, the differences between right and left candidates that were evident in the municipal 
elections seem to be absent in the parliamentary election. There is a beauty premium for both left and right 
candidates such that a beauty increase of one standard deviation attracts about 20% more votes for the 
average  non-incumbent  candidate.  Competence  displays  a  weaker  relationship  with  electoral  success, 
which  is  statistically  significant  for  left  candidates  in  columns  4–6.  However,  this  relationship  is 
weakened substantially and becomes statistically insignificant both for left and right candidates when 
beauty is included in the regression (in columns 7–9). 
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TABLE 4.   Relative success in the parliamentary elections, non-incumbents. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Beauty  24.47***  23.90***  21.82***        20.82***  19.95***  18.03*** 
  (5.90)  (5.86)  (6.05)        (6.01)  (5.89)  (6.19) 
Beauty×Right  -2.26  -0.54  0.66        -0.20  2.35  2.49 
  (9.75)  (9.20)  (8.86)        (10.92)  (10.70)  (8.97) 
Competence        16.54***  16.85*** 15.72***  9.11  9.70*  9.09* 
        (5.11)  (5.18)  (4.89)  (4.83)  (4.84)  (4.66) 
Competence×Right        -7.50  -7.50  -3.51  -3.80  -5.83  -1.68 
        (10.49)  (10.49)  (9.55)  (11.33)  (11.43)  (9.04) 
Male dummy  13.50  11.89  9.93  4.36  3.40  0.81  11.67*  9.92  7.67 
  (6.99)  (8.10)  (9.18)  (7.39)  (8.77)  (9.60)  (6.87)  (8.47)  (9.56) 
Male dummy×Right    5.33  10.01    3.83  8.09    6.12  9.62 
    (15.75)  (17.26)    (16.07)  (17.02)    (14.50)  (16.79) 
Age dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Education and 
occupation dummies 
No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Unreported dummies   
interacted with Right 
No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
List fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of candidates   485  485  485  485  485  485  485  485  485 
R-squared  0.06  0.06  0.18  0.02  0.01  0.15  0.06  0.06  0.18 
   Notes: The dependent variable is Relative success. Right candidates belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates 
belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. The education dummies are Comprehensive school or less (at most 
10 years of schooling); Upper-secondary education (corresponds to 12 years of schooling); Vocational education (10–12 years of 
schooling);  and  University  education  (those  who  have  completed  their  education  and  obtained  degrees).  Upper-secondary 
education  usually  serves  as  preparation  for  university-level  education,  and  many  of  the  candidates  with  upper-secondary 
education listed as highest education have started, but not completed, university studies. Vocational education includes, e.g., basic 
nurses, nurses, commercial school graduates, clerks, and artisans. The occupational dummies are political leader, party worker, 
management,  researcher,  teacher,  upper  white  collar,  medical  doctor,  nurse,  lower  white  collar,  worker,  entrepreneur,  artist, 
student, and not employed. Robust standard errors clustered at the list level in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
   
Similarly, the estimated gender differences in the parliamentary election (Table 4) are quite small 
when  compared  with the municipal elections  (Table  2). The  male  dummy is  positive,  but  small and 
statistically insignificant, both for left and right candidates. Thus, candidate appearance and gender follow 
the same pattern of having noticeably larger differences between left and right candidates in the municipal 
elections. The reason, in our interpretation, is that voters have access to much more information about the 
candidates in parliamentary elections. Table A.6 presents results when incumbents are included. As with 
municipal elections, an incumbency dummy trumps other explanatory variables by an order of magnitude.   18
Yet, both beauty and competence evaluations maintain their statistical significance. 
 
5.   Interpretation 
 
We have established that right candidates look better than left candidates and that there is larger beauty 
premium for right candidates in municipal, but not in parliamentary, elections. We now turn to discussing 
possible interpretations of these findings. 
Why do candidates on the right look better than candidates on the left? One potential explanation is 
that better-looking candidates sort into the party where beauty is more productive electorally. While our 
results are consistent with this explanation, our data are not suited for testing it. Hamermesh and Biddle 
(1994) report weak evidence that beautiful people sort into occupations where their looks are productive. 
This form of selection could be at hand even though jobs are not as easily substitutable on the political 
labor market and even if people choose parties purely in accordance with their ideological conviction. All 
it requires is that people who have found conservatism appealing or have joined a right party are more 
likely to run for office if they look good (since they figure that their appearance will help them).  
A second possible explanation is a general relationship between looks and political opinions. A 
simple  economic  explanation  could  be  that  beautiful  people  earn  more  money  on  the  labor  market 
(Hamermesh  and  Biddle,  1994)  and  are  therefore  –  for  selfish  reasons  –  more  inclined  to  oppose 
redistribution and support parties to the right. A more general psychological explanation could be that 
good-looking people are more likely to perceive the world as a just place (since they are treated better than 
others) – and are therefore inclined to embrace conservative opinions. An empirical analysis by Price at al. 
(2011)  supports  a  link  between  indicators  of  attractiveness  and  measures  of  attitudes  towards 
egalitarianism  (typically  associated  with  the  left).  For  example,  they  find  that  greater  self-reported 
attractiveness is negatively related to a preference for egalitarianism. 
  Why might beauty premia differ across the political spectrum? Our preferred explanation is that 
voters use beauty as an informational cue when evaluating candidates. If right voters expect better-looking   19
candidates to be closer to them ideologically, then the beauty premium should be higher on the right. On 
the basis of the Price et al. (2001) findings, one possibility is that beauty serves as an indication of non-
egalitarianism, a political stance typically associated with sympathizers of the political right. It could also 
be  that  voters  on  the  right,  compared  to  voters  on  the left, consider  beauty  a  stronger  indication  of 
candidate quality. Both of these explanations clarify why the partisan difference is present only at the 
municipal  level.
16  How  so?  At that level,  voters have  less  certain  information  about candidates’ true 
degree of non-egalitarianism or quality, which is why they rely on thin slices of information to assess 
candidates. Hence, voters do not know much about challengers but are easily able to observe how they 
look. Thus voters tend to give a large weight to facial appearance when comparing challengers in the 
municipal elections. In the parliamentary election an additional piece of information becomes available 
about most challengers: their behavior in municipal office. With this information available voters reduce 
the  weight  given  to  facial  appearance.  Given  the  information  about  the  municipal  performance  of 
parliamentary candidates, superficial expectations about beautiful politicians should no longer be that 
effective  in  parliamentary  elections,  pushing  the  beauty  premia  of  left  and  right  candidates  towards 
equalization.
17 In contrast, if the explanation were based on expressive voting (e.g., right-wing voters 
identifying with or cheering for “the beautiful winners”) there would be no reason for the difference in 
beauty premia to appear in municipal elections only.   
Could religion provide another reason for beauty being a more relevant cue for right voters? Since 
attractive  people  are  perceived  as  more  religious  (Crandall  et  al.,  2007;  Naumann  et  al.,  2009), 
conservative voters who care about religiosity may be more inclined to vote for good-looking candidates. 
                                                    
16 Note that McDermott’s (1997) findings on the electoral  effects of gender in low-information elections corresponds to the 
interpretation that voters use beauty as a cue for ideology (rather than for candidate quality).  
17 Furthermore, right candidates are better-looking than left candidates in municipal elections, as can be seen in Table 1. As most 
candidates for parliamentary elections are picked among those who have experience from municipal politics, we should expect the 
right candidates to look better than the left candidates in parliamentary elections already for the reason that the set from which the 
former are selected has better looks.   20
We  are  able  to  investigate  this  explanation  by  using  voting  data  from  a  hypothetical  election.  The 
respondents in our study were asked to vote for one of four candidates (the ones they had just evaluated).
18 
Table 5 reports separately for religious and non-religious respondents the fraction of candidates who were 
selected in the hypothetical election who were also picked as the best looking one. The differences are 
minor  and  not  statistically  significant,  whether  looking  at  mixed-gender  or  same-gender  hypothetical 
elections. Religious voters are, however, considerably more likely to vote for a male candidate.   
 
TABLE 5.   Religious voting in a hypothetical election. 
  Share  of  hypothetically 
elected candidates who were 
selected as best looking 
Share  of  hypothetically 
elected candidates  who were 
men 
Share  of  elected  candidates 
who  were  selected  as  best 
looking  in  same-gender 
hypothetical elections 
Religious voters  44.2%  48.8%  49.0% 
Non-religious voters  44.9%  40.9%  47.7% 
   Note: Religious voters stated that they “would only vote for a politician who believes in God” or that they “would rather vote 
for a politician who believes in God”.  
Finally,  we  cannot  rule  out  the  possibility  that  voters  of  candidates  on  the  right  differ  on  a 
neurocognitive  level  from  voters  of  candidates  on  the  left.  There  are  several  studies  that  point  to 
neurocognitive  foundations  of  political  orientations  and  that  connect  them  to  basic  psychological 
dispositions.
19 Jost et al. (2003) perform a meta-analysis and find that psychological variables, such as 
death anxiety, intolerance of ambiguity, lack of openness to experiencing new things, need for order and 
fear  of  threat,  predict  a  conservative  political  orientation.  More  recent  studies  showing  relationships 
between personality or physiology and political orientation include Block and Block (2006), Westen et al. 
(2006), Amodio et al. (2007), Oxley et al. (2008), Chiao et al. (2009), Schreiber et al. (2009), Zamboni et 
                                                    
18 The instruction read: “Sometimes people have to vote in an election with only a little information. Let us assume that you 
would have to either vote for one of these persons as a member of Parliament [non-US respondents]/the House of Representatives 
[US respondents], or abstain from voting. Which would be your choice?”. (The response alternatives also included ”Prefer not to 
answer”.)  
19 The general approach of this research field is outlined in Fowler and Shreiber (2008).   21
al.  (2009)  and  Vigil  (2010).
20  While  this  literature  does  not  clarify  any  mechanism  for  a  link  from 
neurocognitive  or  psychological  differences  between  left  and  right  sympathizers  to  different  weights 
awarded to different aspects of physical appearance, such as beauty, it does suggest the possibility of such 
a mechanism.  
 
6. Concluding Discussion 
 
Our results indicate that political candidates from the right look better than political candidates from the 
left and that good looks are more important for candidates on the right in the municipal, but not in the 
parliamentary, elections. Our interpretation of this gap in the beauty premium for left and right candidates 
at the local level is that voters, in a setting with low information, use beauty as a cue for candidate 
ideology or quality. For instance, beautiful candidates seem less egalitarian. In the parliamentary elections, 
voters  have  access  to  more  information,  not  least  since  most  parliamentary  candidates  have  been 
politicians at the municipal level, which reduces the weight of beauty as a cue and pushes the beauty 
premia of left and right candidates toward equalization.  
Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the way politics de facto works. Not least, they 
point at a possible link from the way candidates look to policy outcomes: if voters reward beauty, the 
candidates with the best looks and their parties are at an advantage, and their political programs are more 
likely to be implemented. Differential beauty premia could give one side in politics an electoral advantage 
and the importance of such an advantage could depend on political institutions. As Lawson et al. (2010) 
point out, the role of appearance differs between electoral systems: some give more leeway for individual 
candidates rather than parties. This may in turn affect how important looks become in elections and, with 
differential electoral effects of beauty, whether one side of the political spectrum is favored relative to the 
                                                    
20 Alford et al. (2005) show that the underlying basis of political attitudes and ideology may be genetic; cf. Fowler et al. (2008), 
Hatemi et al. (2009) and Settle et al. (2009).   22
other. A broad interpretation of our findings is that the increased importance of television over the last 
decades, may have increased the electoral chances of the political right. In fact, Lenz and Lawson (2011) 
demonstrate that television leads less informed citizens to vote based on candidates’ appearance. 
  Another possible consequence of our findings for low-information elections is that both left and 
right politicians will be more eager to please voters who are less willing to trade off policy against the 
benefits of good-looking politicians. This is in line with models in which parties target redistribution 
toward groups that are most responsive – see, e.g., Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan 
(1996). By the same reasoning, voters who care about the looks of candidates will find it more difficult to 
keep political rents at bay. Thus our findings also suggest that policy platforms could be geared towards 
the preferences of left voters and that right politicians might be able to capture bigger rents when in office. 
  The two consequences just described indicate that the differences in beauty premia could have an 
ambiguous effect on policy outcomes. On the one hand, beauty favors right candidates, in terms of getting 
elected, but on the other hand, political platforms will be geared to left voters to the extent that they care 
less about the looks of politicians.  
Finally, our findings can be related to the different use of emotional tactics by political parties. For 
example,  Westen  (2007)  suggests  that  whereas  Republican  strategists  have  understood  that  emotions 
decide election outcomes, Democrat strategists have clung to a dispassionate view of the mind, making 
them focus on rational argumentation, to their detriment. If we connect this point to our results, it could be 
that  the  Finnish  National  Coalition  Party,  whether  consciously  or  unconsciously,  has  made  use  of 
candidates  with  a  stronger  emotional  appeal.  Clearly,  there  is  scope  for  more  research  in  this  area. 
Pinpointing  how  the  appearance  of  candidates  on  the  left  and  on  the  right  of  the  political  spectrum 
influences the democratic process should be seen as an ongoing research program.   23
Appendix 
 
TABLE A.1.   Factors that influenced voters in choosing parliamentary candidates. 
Influence  Share of right voters being 
significantly or somewhat 
influenced 
Share of left voters being 
significantly or somewhat 
influenced 
Candidate’s gender  32%  38% 
Candidate’s age  28%  31% 
Candidate’s educational background  56%  31% 
Candidate’s previous experience in politics  62%  63% 
Candidate’s presence and style  39%  34% 
Candidate’s fame  37%  33% 
Candidate’s views and comments  87%  80% 
Candidate  represents  the  party  supported 
by the voter 
85%  73% 
Candidate’s election 
campaign and advertisements 
25%  21% 
Recommendations 
of a friend, aquintance or relative 
10%  9% 
Comments  and  support  of  a  non-
governmental organization 
16%  5% 
   Notes: Right candidates belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the 
Left Alliance. The numbers presented in the Table and in the paper refer to voters for these three parties. 
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Political leader  2.4  12.9 
Party worker  2.3  2.2 
Management  6.3  5.5 
Researcher  3.9  3.6 
Teacher  7.2  10.0 
Upper white collar  10.7  9.8 
Medical doctor  1.3  3.4 
Nurse  4.7  5.0 
Lower white collar  12.3  11.0 
Worker  16.8  14.1 
Entrepreneur  6.0  5.1 
Artist  2.2  2.0 
Student  8.8  5.4 
Not employed  2.8  1.5 
Not listed  12.2  8.5 
   Notes: The  occupation data is reported on electoral lists  and have been  classified by us  according to the classification  of 
Statistics Finland (2001), though we have merged certain occupational categories with a small number of candidates and listed 
party workers as a group of their own. 
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TABLE A.3.   Average trait evaluations according to respondent ideology (standard deviations in parentheses). 
Candidates  Respondents  Beauty  Competence  Number of candidates 
Right  Right  2.96 (0.70)  3.40 (0.54)  244 
p-value of difference    0.0000  0.0012   
Left   Right  2.65 (0.72)  3.25 (0.60)  459 
Right  Left  2.85 (0.75)  3.45 (0.53)  169 
p-value of difference    0.0014  0.0043   
Left  Left  2.62 (0.73)  3.29 (0.63)  343 
Right female   Right  3.07 (0.80)  3.33 (0.49)  133 
p-value of difference    0.0000  0.0532   
Left female  Right  2.70 (0.80)  3.21 (0.58)  233 
Right female  Left  3.08 (0.83)  3.42 (0.52)  89 
p-value of difference    0.0067  0.0805   
Left female  Left  2.77 (0.78)  3.29 (0.58)  159 
Right male   Right  2.84 (0.55)  3.49 (0.59)  111 
p-value of difference    0.0007  0.0055   
Left male  Right  2.60 (0.63)  3.29 (0.61)  226 
Right male   Left  2.59 (0.55)  3.49 (0.54)  80 
p-value of difference    0.3093  0.0212     
Left male  Left  2.50 (0.66)  3.29 (0.68)  184 
   Notes: The Table contains candidates both from the municipal and the parliamentary elections. Right candidates belong to the 
National Coalition Party. Left candidates belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. One observation is the 
average  evaluation of one candidate. Right  respondents “strongly disagree” or “somewhat disagree”  with the suggestion “to 
increase taxes on those with high incomes in your country, and distribute the money to those with low incomes”. Left respondents 
“strongly agree” or “somewhat agree” with the same suggestion. P-values from a t-test of equal means are reported between each 
pair of average evaluations for right and left candidates. 
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TABLE A.4.   Average trait evaluations according to respondent country (standard deviations in parentheses). 
Candidates  Respondents’ 
country 
Beauty  Competence  Number of 
candidates 
Right  Sweden  2.85 (0.75)  3.45 (0.53)  137 
p-value of difference    0.0003  0.0094   
Left  Sweden  2.56 (0.76)  3.27 (0.68)  261 
Right   United States  2.94 (0.78)  3.40 (0.56)  170 
p-value of difference    0.0000  0.0095   
Left  United States  2.62 (0.78)  3.25 (0.65)  328 
Right female   Sweden  3.14 (0.77)  3.54 (0.51)  68 
p-value of difference    0.0000  0.0007   
Left female  Sweden  2.65 (0.79)  3.23 (0.64)  124 
Right female  United States  3.03 (0.87)  3.35 (0.50)  98 
p-value of difference    0.0006  0.0697   
Left female  United States  2.65 (0.85)  3.23 (0.55)  165 
Right male   Sweden  2.56 (0.61)  3.35 (0.54)  69 
p-value of difference    0.4033  0.6503   
Left male  Sweden  2.48 (0.73)  3.31 (0.71)  137 
Right male   United States  2.82 (0.62)  3.46 (0.63)  72 
p-value of difference    0.0168  0.0476   
Left male  United States  2.59 (0.69)  3.27 (0.73)  163 
   Notes: The Table contains candidates both from the municipal and the parliamentary elections. Right candidates belong to the 
National Coalition Party. Left candidates belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. One observation is the 
average evaluation of one candidate. P-values from a t-test of equal means are reported between each pair of average evaluations 
for right and left candidates. 
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TABLE A.5.   Average trait evaluations according to candidate attire (standard deviations in parentheses). 
Respondents  Candidates  Tie or blouse 
and/or suite 
Beauty  Competence  Number of 
candidates 
All  All  Yes  2.75 (0.67)  3.41 (0.46)  823 
p-value of difference    0.1751  0.0000   
All  All  No  2.70 (0.64)  3.16 (0.45)  534 
Right  All  Yes  2.77 (0.75)  3.42 (0.59)  424 
p-value of difference    0.4661  0.0000   
Right  All  No  2.73 (0.70)  3.13 (0.52)  279 
Left  All  Yes  2.70 (0.74)  3.44 (0.60)  316 
p-value of difference    0.9118  0.0000   
Left  All  No  2.69 (0.75)  3.18 (0.57)  196 
Right  Female  Yes  2.83 (0.85)  3.35 (0.57)  225 
p-value of difference    0.9937  0.0001   
Right  Female  No  2.83 (0.76)  3.11 (0.50)  141 
Right  Male  Yes  2.71 (0.61)  3.50 (0.61)  199 
p-value of difference    0.2565  0.0000   
Right  Male  No  2.63 (0.62)  3.15 (0.54)  138 
Left  Female  Yes  2.84 (0.79)  3.36 (0.60)  169 
p-value of difference    0.3409  0.2848   
Left  Female  No  2.95 (0.84)  3.28 (0.45)  79 
Left  Male  Yes  2.54 (0.64)  3.54 (0.59)  147 
p-value of difference    0.8420  0.0000   
Left  Male  No  2.52 (0.62)  3.12 (0.64)  117 
   Notes: The Table contains candidates both from the municipal and the parliamentary elections. Right candidates belong to the 
National Coalition Party. Left candidates belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. One observation is the 
average evaluation of one candidate. P-values from a t-test of equal means are reported between each pair of average evaluations 
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TABLE A.6.   Relative success in the municipal and parliamentary elections, incumbents and non-incumbents. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Beauty  17.07**  7.49  16.95***  15.68** 
  (6.55)  (6.82)  (5.67)  (5.98) 
Beauty×Right  3.03  5.31  -8.32  -8.98 
  (6.59)  (7.19)  (9.78)  (7.91) 
Competence  -2.03  1.97  11.48***  12.55** 
  (10.64)  (7.37)  (3.38)  (4.12) 
Competence×Right  -0.64  -10.18  -14.30  -14.03* 
  (11.93)  (8.51)  (9.46)  (7.78) 
Incumbent  466.59***  309.95***  224.63***  72.60*** 
  (100.75)  (89.99)  (38.69)  (23.13) 
Incumbent×Right  -207.24*  -119.37  -69.27  -62.77** 
  (111.18)  (99.91)  (51.01)  (25.65) 
Male dummy  -25.35*  -29.82**  -7.83  -7.85 
  (13.20)  (9.00)  (9.66)  (12.05) 
Male dummy×Right  27.79*  21.95**  24.90*  31.85* 
  (13.44)  (9.20)  (13.30)  (16.95) 
Age dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Education and occupation dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Unreported variables  interacted with Right  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
List fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of candidates   779  779  575  575 
R-squared  0.41  0.59  0.23  0.28 
   Notes: The dependent variable is Relative success. Right candidates belong to the National Coalition Party. Left candidates 
belong to the Social Democratic Party or to the Left Alliance. Robust standard errors clustered at the list level in parentheses. The 
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